Firms` Strategic Decisions: Theoretical and Empirical Findings

Volume: 1

Double-Sided Moral Hazard and Margin-Based Royalty

Author(s): Tatsuhiko Nariu, Kaoru Ueda, Dong Joon Lee and Shunsuke Shimizu

Pp: 39-54 (16)

DOI: 10.2174/9781681080383115010006

* (Excluding Mailing and Handling)


This chapter analyzes royalty modes in the franchise arrangements of convenience stores under double-sided moral hazard. In Japan, the majority of franchisors charge margin-based royalties based on gross margin rather than sales-based royalties based on sales. We show that the franchisor can attain the first-best outcome by adopting margin-based royalties under double-sided moral hazard. We consider a case where a franchisee sells two kinds of goods; one is shipped from its franchisor and the other is purchased from another (independent) manufacturer. In this case, the franchisor is completely unable to control the wholesale price of the goods bought from the manufacturer. Therefore, the franchisor cannot achieve the first-best outcome via sales-based royalties under double-sided moral hazard.

Keywords: Double-sided moral hazard, franchise arrangement, franchise contract, franchise fee, joint profits, margin-based royalty, risk neutral, royalty rate, royalty structure, sales-based royalty.

Related Books
© 2024 Bentham Science Publishers | Privacy Policy