Firms` Strategic Decisions: Theoretical and Empirical Findings

Volume: 2

Parking with Discount: Generalized Oligopoly Model with Influence Coefficients

Author(s): Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov-Jr, Daniel Flores Curiel and Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov

Pp: 3-28 (26)

DOI: 10.2174/9781681082530116020003

* (Excluding Mailing and Handling)


In this chapter, we consider an oligopolistic model for parking lots with conjectures concerning the price variations depending upon the agents’ offered parking space increase or decrease, given an existing exogenous shop driven demand, which may be affected by a parking discount for shop customers. Taking into account piecewise linear cost functions, which is quite natural assumption for parking lots, we are able to elaborate existence of an exterior equilibrium. Moreover, under some natural assumptions we are able to introduce conjectured or interior equilibrium. And we prove the existence and uniqueness of it. The concept of equilibrium with the conjectures is different from the classical Cournot-Nash one. We can establish that there exists a unique interior (conjectured) equilibrium (which is different from the classical Cournot-Nash equilibrium) in a model where firms have a piecewise linear cost function.

Keywords: Capacity, consistent conjectural variations equilibrium, demand structure, exterior equilibrium, homogeneous good, influence coefficients, interior equilibrium, mixed oligopoly, parking discount, parking lot.

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